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Executive Summary 
Despite the importance of understanding how race intersects with police use of force, little 
research has used police administrative data to investigate whether or not disparities exist. 
Because the dominant narrative around race and law enforcement is that crime rates drive 
police behavior, we used data from the National Justice Database—the Center for Policing 
Equity’s project to provide national-level data and analyses on police behavior—to 
investigate racial disparities in use of force benchmarking against demographics of local 
arrest rates. Even though this is a conservative estimate of bias, the analyses of 12 law 
enforcement departments from geographically and demographically diverse locations 
revealed that racial disparities in police use of force persist even when controlling for racial 
distribution of local arrest rates. Additionally, multiple participating departments still 
demonstrated racial disparities when force incidents were benchmarked exclusively against 
Part I violent arrests, such that Black residents were still more likely than Whites to be 
targeted for force.  This method is very likely prone to underestimate racial disparities 
because African Americans are overrepresented in violent crime arrests but Part I violent 
crimes constitute only 1/24th of all arrests nationally (BJS, 2012), and previous research has 
found arrests for violent crimes to involve police use of force only 1.3 times as often as 
arrests for all other crimes (Worden, 1995). These disparities were robust across multiple 
categories of force (hand weapon, OC spray, and Tasers).  
In addition to these findings and consistent with previous literature, Taser usage represented 
a large percentage of departments’ use of force. Specifically, residents who were targeted 
for force were far more likely to be targeted by Tasers than by deadly weapons. While 
previous research has demonstrated the stark rise of Taser usage (Taylor et al., 2011) and its 
potential to reduce injuries (Alpert et al., 2011), the relatively high incidence of Taser usage 
relative to all other categories (it was the second most common category across all 
departments trailing only hand/body weapons) deserves significantly more public and 
scholarly attention given that Tasers are also the category closest to use of deadly force in 
most use of force continuums. It is important to be cautious about overgeneralizing these 
results because of the relatively small number of departments and because we do not know 
very much about what residents did during the interactions that turned forceful. However, the 
narrative that crime is the primary driver of racial disparities is not supported within the 
context of these departments. This suggests that scholars and practitioners should look at 
racial disparities in other situational factors (e.g., resistance, drug and alcohol use, and officer 
perceptions of dangerousness) to determine whether or not they explain racial disparities in 
force. 
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Introduction 
What does equitable use of force look like? Despite an elaborated literature on how to 
assess racial bias in police stops, there has been relatively little research on the appropriate 
distribution of coercive force by law enforcement (Bayley, 1994). Rather, scholarly attention 
on use of force has mostly focused on issues of measurement, identifying rates of police 
brutality, or on violent officer psychological profiles (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Muir, 1979; 
Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). While previous research consistently identifies racial disparities in 
the application of force (e.g., Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 1996; Worden, 1995), this limited 
literature has yet to create a consensus either with regard to how use of force should be 
measured or how bias should be assessed. This means that public discourse around police 
use of force remains largely untouched by empirical insights. 
As a result, to the degree that there is a dominant narrative among police executives about 
racial disparities in use of force, it is the same as the dominant narrative around racial 
disparities in policing in general: They are unfortunate, they are unintentional, and they stem 
mostly from racial disparities in crime rates. This narrative is best exemplified by the words of 
Chief Ed Flynn of the Milwaukee Police Department who claimed that, “If I draw an 
ellipse over our poorest neighborhoods and then find an ellipse and draw it where most of 
our 911 calls are, and then draw the ellipse over where most of our crime victims are... it's the 
same neighborhoods and the same zip codes” (Teich, 2013). The extension of this argument 
is that police use force proportionally to the incidence of criminality within a population. 
Similarly, Bernard Parks, the former chief of the Los Angeles Police Department was on 
record as commenting that, “It's not the fault of the police when they stop minority males or 
put them in jail.  It's the fault of the minority males for committing the crime.  In my mind, it is 
not a great revelation that, if officers are looking for criminal activity, they're going to look at 
the kind of people who are listed on crime reports” (Glaser, 2014, pg. 96). How, then, could 
we test that hypothesis? 
Unfortunately, there is no way to take a true measure of criminality within a population, and 
the nearest approximation is problematic. Arrest data, which provide the closest estimate of 
criminal activity within a population (short of direct observation), are compromised by the 
very nature of who makes arrests. That is, because police arrest people and our concern is 
with the possibility that police behave in a biased manner when applying force, there is the 
strong likelihood that arrest data would be biased in the same manner as use of force data. 
Benchmarking use of force data to arrest data likely underestimates the level of bias that 
may exist in police use of force. This discourages scientists from benchmarking police 
outcomes by arrest rates. 
If, however, a department were to demonstrate racial disparities in the application of force 
even controlling for arrest rates, this would provide reason for pause. If that pattern held for a 
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plurality of departments, it would also cast doubt on the prospect that disparities in criminal 
behavior explain disparities in force. In this light, benchmarking police use of force to arrest 
rates may prove a usefully conservative (prone to false negatives, if anything) test of 
departmental bias despite the problem of endogeneity. The current report examines racial 
disparities in use of force across 12 departments participating in the National Justice 
Database—the Center for Policing Equity’s project to provide national-level data and 
analyses on police behavior. 
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Conceptual Problems with Measuring Police 
Use of Force 
As Terrill and Mastrofski note, there are (broadly) three conceptual problems with measuring 
police use of force: measuring “excessive” force versus all force, measuring force 
dichotomously, and measuring force incidents as static rather than dynamic. The first critique 
stems from the fact that many who investigate police use of force are particularly concerned 
with its abuses. As a result, they focus on the rare cases where force is used unwarrantedly 
or far out of proportion to what resident resistance and criminal activity requires. 
Investigating a rare subset of a rare behavior is still important, but without the broader 
universe of data for all use of force incidents, this research fails to provide a representative 
picture of how public safety officials use coercive force. For instance, “less lethal” force such 
as Tasers may be far more common than lethal force and have a relatively larger impact 
(Taylor et al., 2011), but will be overlooked if the focus is on lethal force. Accordingly, Terrill & 
Mastrofski, among others, have encouraged researchers to examine the full range of force 
options, and not just lethal or excessive uses. In response to this critique, the present 
analyses include all use of force data provided by participating departments. 
The second critique rightly points out that there is a great difference between being 
physically restrained by an officer’s hands and having a baton strike one’s knees. However, 
in part because administrative data are so inconsistently archived, previous researchers have 
sometimes been forced to analyze merely the presence or absence of force. Such an 
approach erases the differences between different levels of severity on the use of force 
continuum. In response to this critique, the present report includes two sections that examine 
severity in the use of force. The first details racial disparities at each level of force. The 
second creates a weighted use of force score with more severe force on the continuum 
being weighted more heavily than less severe force. 
Finally, as previous scholars have noted (Alpert & Dunham, 2004; Bayley, 1994; Worden, 
1995), a thorough understanding of police use of force is not possible without a thorough 
account of the interaction that produced it. That is, without understanding the relative timing 
of a resident’s and officer’s behavior, it is possible to misunderstand the justification for 
applying force. For instance, arresting someone simply for jaywalking would not seem to 
warrant the use of a Taser. The situation is far different if the jaywalking individual produces 
a weapon and makes threats. Sadly, these data are not often captured in use of force forms. 
When they are, it is often in the context of a narrative that is time-intensive to extract. This is 
why some of the most rigorous previous research on force has relied on direct observations 
of police encounters. Because the purpose of the National Justice Database is to provide a 
scalable approach to issues of equity in policing, using observational data is not feasible and 
the present research will not account for the dynamic nature of these interactions. 
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However, as important as it is to note what specific factors lead to force, observational data 
do not take the place of arrest data. In other words, while factors such as challenging an 
officer, drug or alcohol use, or time of day may exacerbate the likelihood that force will be 
used, they do not remove the role of a resident’s criminal behavior in an officer’s likelihood 
of using force. Across the limited literature, officers use force when making arrests between 
15 and 20% of the time as opposed to the 1 to 2% of police contacts overall that result in the 
application of force (Smith et al., 2009). Likewise, racial disparities in situational factors have 
not often been privileged in the scholarly or practitioner discussions of racial disparities in 
police outcomes, including force. Therefore, while the present research will not address the 
important dynamic elements of use of force incidents, it will serve as a conservative estimate 
of bias in use of force as well as a useful test of the validity of the dominant narrative. 
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Organization of the Report 
To test the hypothesis that racial disparities in crime (indexed by arrest rates) explain racial 
disparities in police use of force, this report is organized in four sections. The first is an 
analysis of overall use of force rates. The subsequent three sections test for racial disparities 
in different ways. The first of these presents an analysis of overall racial disparities in rates of 
use of force. The second presents an analysis of use of force disparities within each 
standardized category of use of force severity. And the third presents an analysis of a 
weighted use of force score. Within each section we present analyses of racial disparities 
benchmarked against 1) the demographics of each jurisdiction, 2) the demographics of arrest 
rates for all offenses in each jurisdiction, and 3) the demographics of the arrest rates for Part I 
violent offenses in each jurisdiction. Finally, within each section, we also reveal the 
percentage of participating departments that demonstrate racial disparities in use of force 
when controlling for violent crime arrest rates. 
Although use of force incidents are as much as 20 times more likely in arrest scenarios than 
in non-arrest scenarios (Smith et al., 2009), previous research has not demonstrated that 
arrests for violent crime are drastically more likely to result in the use of force. For instance, 
Worden (1995) found that arrests for violent crimes are roughly 1.3 times more likely to result 
in force than are arrests for non-violent crimes. The Bureau of Justice Statistics Violent Crime 
Index reveals that violent crime accounts for roughly 1/24th of all crimes.  Therefore, we 
include an analysis of use of force benchmarked on violent crime not because violent crime 
is peculiarly likely to produce more force, and not because violent crime is an importantly 
large percentage of crimes. Rather, it is included to provide the strongest and most 
conservative test of the “crime produces disparities” hypothesis. This is why we also include 
an analysis of the distribution of departments that demonstrate racial disparities in force that 
are robust to this benchmark. 
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Agency Characteristics 
The 12 agencies that contributed data to our use of force dataset serve populations ranging 
from under 100,000 to over 1 million, with a median size of roughly 600,000 residents.  The 
dataset also includes one large transit system serving several million potential riders.   The 
agencies are geographically diverse, spanning the Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, and 
West.  Their populations range from predominantly White (6 agencies) to predominantly 
Black or Latino (1 agency) to more racially and ethnically diverse (meaning that no single 
racial/ethnic group comprises 50% or more of the population, 5 agencies).  According to 
Uniform Crime Report data, annual violent crime rates in these communities ranged from 
under 500 to over 2000 per 100,000 residents, and annual property crime rates ranged from 
under 5,000 to nearly 10,000 per 100,000 residents.  
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Data Sharing, Reporting, and Standardization 
Although one agency participating in the larger Justice Database project was unwilling to 
share use of force data, and another agency did not share information on level of force used, 
most agencies provided use of force datasets that spanned a range of incident types from 
lethal force to less lethal force to hands and body weapons.   
 
DATA STRUCTURE 
The agencies’ datasets varied considerably in their structure.  In some agencies, an event 
involving a single citizen and multiple officers was recorded as multiple incidents.  In others, 
an event involving a single officer and multiple citizens was recorded as multiple 
incidents.  In addition, quirks with data extraction sometimes led to incidents involving 
multiple types of force (e.g., physical restraint and a canine bite) generating multiple rows of 
data.  To facilitate comparisons across agencies and benchmarking to population size and 
arrest counts, we standardized all datasets so that each citizen involved in an event 
generated a new incident, whereas multiple officers and types of force did not.1 We also 
excluded all data for incidents occurring in years for which we did not have a full year of data 
(e.g., Oct-Dec 2013 or Jan-March 2016). 
After restructuring the data as described, our resulting dataset contained 19,269 incidents 
occurring across 30 department-years.  Each agency contributed between 1 and 6 years of 
data to the dataset.  All data were collected between 2010 and 2015. The top portion of 
Table 1 provides information on the approximate population size of each agency, along with 
the number of years of data the agency provided and the total number of incidents recorded 
during those years. 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 For one agency, we were unable to distinguish multiple citizens involved in a given incident from multiple officers 
using force on the same citizen; for this agency, we excluded potentially duplicate observations, which affected 8% of 
all use of force incidents for that agency. 
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LEVEL OF FORCE 
Another source of variation was in the categorization of force, and the universe of incident 
types included in the dataset.  All agencies that provided information on level of force 
included separate categories for lethal force, OC Spray, and bodily contact.  Most agencies 
also had categories for less lethal force, batons or similar weapons, and canine use.  Some 
agencies recorded instances where force was threatened but not used, including verbal 
commands and drawing or pointing a firearm or ECD. 
Some agencies recorded only the highest level of force used, while others listed multiple 
specific types of force used in each incident.  To standardize level of force across agencies, 
we developed a ranking of levels of force and then classified each incident by the highest 
level of force used.  Our severity scale consisted of six categories - lethal, less lethal or 
Taser, canine, OC spray, weapon, and hands or body - and excluded incidents that involved 
only the threat of force, which we refer to as officer presence.  We also excluded a very small 
number of incidents that specified vehicles as weapons used (e.g., PIT). 
The bottom portion of Table 1 summarizes the distributions of recorded incidents across 
these six categories, as well as the officer presence and vehicle groups that were excluded 
from further analysis.  Results are presented separately for each agency to show how data 
reporting varied across the agencies. In 6 departments, hands and body was the most 
common type of force used.  In 2 departments, officer presence was most common.  In 2 
additional departments, less lethal or Taser use was most common.  In 1 department, hands 
and body and less lethal or Taser incidents were equally common, each comprising 44% of 
recorded use of force incidents.   
Removing the officer presence and vehicle categories reduced the number of incidents in 
our dataset from 19,269 to 14,731.   
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Table 1.  Use of Force Incidents by Agency and Highest Level of Force Used 
	              Department A B C D E F G H I J K L Total 
Population Size Under 
100K 
100- 
500K 
500K
- 1M 
500K
- 1M 
100- 
500K 
Over 
1M 
Under 
100K 
500K
- 1M 
500K
- 1M 
Over 
1M 
500K
- 1M 
100- 
500K 
 Number of Years 1 1 4 6 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 1 30
Number of Incidents 88 293 1,251 3,893 386 1,115 953 2,440 1,689 3,688 885 2,588 19,269 
 
             Highest Level of 
Force (%) 
                Lethal 0 2 2 0 2 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 1 
   Less Lethal and 
Taser 
39 44 48 0 27 5 17 2 25 
5 
35 4 11 
   Canine 6 0 5 0 8 0 2 0 1 1 10 0 1 
   Weapon 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 
   OC Spray 18 9 12 0 3 1 14 2 7 3 9 5 4 
   Hands and Body 24 44 31 0 58 67 31 36 66 69 43 17 37 
   Officer Presence* 13 0 0 0 1 21 25 56 0 21 0 73 24 
   Vehicle* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Not Recorded 1 0 1 100 0 5 6 0 1 0 3 0 21 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
*Incidents in these categories are excluded from subsequent analyses due to low rates (vehicle) and 
inconsistency of use (officer presence). 
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Findings 
SECTION I: VOLUME OF INCIDENTS 
Having standardized the data by counting each citizen once, excluding data from partial 
years, and dropping incidents involving only vehicle maneuvers or the threat of force, we can 
now compare use of force counts and disparities across departments.  Table 2 displays 
summary statistics on annual use of force counts for each agency. The total volume of use of 
force incidents ranged from 77 in a single year (fewer than 7 per month) to 1,689 per year 
(approximately 140 per month or nearly 5 per day).  The mean annual volume of use of force 
incidents was 576, fewer than 2 incidents per day.  
 
Table 2.  Annual Volume of Use of Force 
Incidents, by Citizen Race/Ethnicity 
Sample:  12 Department-Years (only most recent year for each 
department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Total 576 412 77 1689 
Black NH 250 159 35 664 
White NH 191 130 33 573 
Hispanic 98 25 0 586 
Asian NH 7 3 0 29 
Other NH 9 2 0 46 
 
*NH = Non-Hispanic 
 
 
SECTION II: USE OF FORCE RATES 
The goal of Section II is to provide a broad overview of the distribution of force. Although 
counts do not capture the severity of force, they do provide an impression of how often force 
is applied and the disparities in that distribution. Again, each of the next three sections will 
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include four analyses: the disparities in use of force benchmarked to 1) population, 2) arrests 
for all offenses, and 3) Part I violent arrests, followed by 4) the percentage(s) of departments 
whose racially disparate treatment of Black residents persists in the face of controls for 
violent crime.  
 
Use of Force Rates Benchmarked to Population and Arrests 
Comparing counts of use of force incidents across agencies is not particularly informative 
unless we benchmark the counts against the sizes and racial/ethnic distributions of the 
populations the agencies are serving and local crime rates. We obtained population data 
from the American Community Survey based on the 2010 Census.  We obtained arrest data 
using the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Arrest Data Analysis Tool.2  Arrest counts were 
obtained for 2008-2012 and averaged across years to create annual arrest count averages 
for all offenses and for Part I violent offenses.3 
Table 3 presents the population benchmarking results.  Rates are reported as the number of 
use of force incidents per 100,000 residents and rounded to the nearest whole number.  The 
overall mean use of force rate was 108 per 100,000 residents, just over 1 in 1,000.  The mean 
rate for Black residents was 273 per 100,000, which is 2.5 times as high as the overall rate 
and 3.6 times as high as the rate for White residents (76 per 100,000).  Mean use of force 
rates for Hispanic residents, Asian residents, and residents of other races were lower than 
those of White and Black residents.   
 
                                                   
2 The arrest data analysis tool is available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm# 
3 For one department, we used older arrest data because 2008-2012 data were not available.  
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Table 3.  Use of Force Rates per 100,000 
Residents, by Citizen Race/Ethnicity 
Sample:  12 Department-Years (only most recent year for each 
department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Total 108 103 7 214 
Black NH 273 207 41 769 
White NH 76 68 4 174 
Hispanic 65 51 0 211 
Asian NH 15 6 0 41 
Other NH 38 11 0 150 
 
 
Population benchmarks provide only a crude method for estimating disproportionality.  They 
allow for an inference that force is being used in a manner that is disproportionate to 
presence in the general population, but do not allow for a clear inference as to whether the 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Total Black	NH White	NH Hispanic Asian	NH Other	NH
Figure 1. Mean Use of Force Rates per 100, 000 
Residents, by Citizen Race/Ethnicity
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force is disproportionate to presence in any particular area or to legitimately provocative 
behavior.  A more direct, albeit still limited, proxy for level of provocative behavior would be 
actual offending.  The closest available index of offending is arrest rates.  While arrest rates 
are confounded by racial bias in policing practices, they provide a closer approximation than 
simple resident population. 
Tables 4 and 5 present arrest and violent arrest benchmarking results for Black and White 
individuals only.  In Table 4, rates are reported as the number of use of force incidents per 
1,000 arrests for all types of offenses and rounded to the nearest whole number.  In Table 5, 
rates are reported as the number of use of force incidents per 1,000 arrests for Part I violent 
offenses and rounded to the nearest whole number.   Comparing Tables 2, 3, and 4 reveals 
that benchmarking to the population increases the size of Black-White disparities in use of 
force considerably, whereas benchmarking to arrests reduces Black-White disparities, but 
does not eliminate them.  Table 5 shows that benchmarking to violent Part I arrests reverses 
the direction of the Black-White gap.   
 
 
Table 4.  Use of Force Rates per 1,000 Arrests*, by 
Citizen Race 
Sample:  12 Department-Years (only most recent year for each 
department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black** 46 21 9 308 
White** 36 15 5 255 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include all offenses.   
**Use of Force data are for non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White 
citizens, whereas arrest data are for all Black and all White citizens 
regardless of ethnicity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
                           
18 
 
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 
 
 
policingequity.org  
Table 5.  Use of Force Rates per 1,000 Arrests for 
Violent Offenses*, by Citizen Race 
Sample:  12 Department-Years (only most recent year for each department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black** 731 356 166 3989 
White** 1003 421 201 7111 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include arrests for Part I violent 
crimes only.   
**Use of Force data are for non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White 
citizens, whereas arrest data are for all Black and all White citizens 
regardless of ethnicity.  
 
 
Contrary to the dominant narrative, these analyses reveal that racial disparities persist even 
when benchmarking on all arrests. Although these disparities dissipate (and even reverse) 
when controlling for violent Part I arrests, it is noteworthy that 5 of the 12 participating 
departments (42%) still evidence disproportionate targeting of Black residents when violent 
arrests are controlled. Given the rarity of Part I violent crimes and a lack of evidence that 
arrests for violent crime significantly increase the likelihood of police use of force, these 
findings suggest that crime rates are an insufficient explanation for disparities in the 
application of police force. They do not, however, provide any sense of whether racial 
disparities in the application of force are more or less pronounced when officers use greater 
or lesser force. Sections III and IV are designed to provide clarity on this point. 
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SECTION III: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SEVERITY OF FORCE 
Having standardized use of force data from each department into six categories, we 
analyzed racial disparities in use of force for each of those categories, first benchmarked on 
population, then on arrests for all offenses and arrests for Part I violent crimes. Finally, we 
calculated the number of departments whose anti-Black racial disparities persisted even 
when controlling for Part I violent crimes. Our goal in the analyses reported in the following 
section was to determine whether or not the racial disparities observed in Section II were 
distributed across all categories of force or were more pronounced in some than in others. 
For the figures that follow, we plotted the means using only the most recent year of data 
from each department.  
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Lethal Less	Lethal	
and	Taser
Canine Weapon OC	Spray Hands	
and	Body
Figure 2.  Mean Use of Force Rates per 1,000 Arrests, 
by Severity and Citizen Race
Black
White
Note:	The	difference	in	means	between	Black	and	White	residents	is	statistically	significant	at	the	<.05	level		
for	the	Less	lethal	and	Taser	category	(p=.016)	and	at	the	p<.10	level	for	the	OC	spray	(p=.054)	and	Hands	
and	body	(p=.071)	categories.		Mean	differences	for	the	lethal,	canine,	and	weapon	cateogries	have	p-
values	above	0.10.
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Table 6.  Use of Force Rates per 1,000 Arrests*, by Severity and Citizen Race 
Sample:  8 to 11 Department-Years 
 
Black Citizens 
 
White Citizens 
    Mean Median Min Max   Mean Median Min Max   N
Lethal 0.37 0.29 0.00 1.35 
 
0.64 0.18 0.00 3.91  
8 
Less Lethal and Taser 6.64 6.76 1.22 11.94 
 
4.46 4.48 0.71 11.93  
11 
Canine 0.67 0.45 0.00 1.71 
 
0.64 0.30 0.00 3.91  
11 
Weapon 0.34 0.09 0.00 2.17 
 
0.19 0.07 0.00 0.78  
10 
OC Spray 3.34 1.41 0.41 9.91 
 
1.82 0.62 0.00 7.04  
11 
Hands and Body 36.88 13.07 3.41 282.36   30.39 9.35 2.20 238.66   11 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include arrests for all offenses.   
 
 
Table 7.  Use of Force Rates per 1,000 Arrests for Violent Offenses*, by Severity 
and Citizen Race 
Sample:  Maximum of 11 Department-Years 
 
Black Citizens 
 
White Citizens 
    Mean 
Media
n 
Min Max 
  
Mean Median Min Max   N 
Lethal 6.92 5.81 0.00 21.77 
 
16.70 6.54 0.00 90.25  
8 
Less Lethal and Taser 122.71 99.53 18.46 376.64 
 
133.05 103.31 24.10 333.33  
11 
Canine 10.87 7.26 0.00 32.05 
 
15.90 6.57 0.00 90.25  
11 
Weapon 5.30 1.86 0.00 28.09 
 
4.76 2.66 0.00 18.05  
10 
OC Spray 53.47 29.50 6.15 159.65 
 
41.86 28.36 0.00 162.45  
11 
Hands and Body 564.69 210.45 28.44 3651.69   850.27 273.40 118.15 6666.67   11 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include arrests for Part I violent crimes only.   
 
 
As Figure 2 and Table 6 show, the mean use of force rate for Black citizens was higher than 
that for White citizens in all categories, save the use of lethal force, when controlling for 
arrests for all offenses. When controlling for resident arrests for violent Part I offenses, racial 
disparities that disadvantaged Blacks persisted in weapon use and the use of OC spray (see 
Table 7). All other categories revealed disparities that disadvantaged Whites.  
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Finally, some departments revealed robust disparities across levels of force even when using 
this most conservative test.  As Figure 3 shows, Black-White gaps in canine use and in OC 
spray use persisted in 55 percent of departments after violent arrests were controlled.  
Likewise, Black-White disparities persisted in weapon use in 40 percent of departments, in 
less lethal and Taser and hands and body use in 36% of departments, and in lethal force in 
25 percent of departments. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of Departments
with Use of Force Rates Disadvantaging Blacks, 
Benchmarked on Violent Arrests 
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SECTION IV: SUMMED SEVERITY SCORES 
In addition to variation in rates of use of force, it might still be important to have some 
measure of how disparities in stop counts intersect with disparities in stop severity. 
Therefore, Section IV repeats these analyses with a weighted use of force score. The 
weighted measure of force severity was created as follows.  
• Lethal incidents were assigned a weight of 6. 
• Less lethal and Taser incidents were assigned a weight of 5. 
• Canine incidents were assigned a weight of 4. 
• OC spray incidents were assigned a weight of 3. 
• Weapon incidents were assigned a weight of 2. 
• Hands and body incidents were assigned a weight of 1. 
 
Using this weighting scheme, 100 hands and body incidents carry the same weight as 50 
weapon incidents, 25 canine incidents, or 20 less lethal incidents. 
We then summed scores for each racial or ethnic category.  Table 8 presents descriptive 
statistics on summed severity scores using each agency’s most recent year of data.   
 
Table 8.  Annual Summed UoF Severity Scores, by 
Citizen Race/Ethnicity 
Sample:  11 Department-Years (only most recent year for each department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black NH 479 227 108 1185 
White NH 426 336 75 1130 
Hispanic 199 44 0 1194 
Asian NH 11 5 0 38 
Other NH 17 5 0 77 
 
As with overall use of force counts, these statistics are not particularly informative unless we 
consider the populations served by these agencies and/or local crime rates.  In Tables 9, 10, 
and 11, we benchmark these severity scores to population, to all arrests, and to violent Part I 
arrests, respectively.   
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Table 9.  UoF Severity Score per 100,000 Residents, by 
Citizen Race/Ethnicity 
Sample:  11 Department-Years (only most recent year for each department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black NH 653 531 48 1745 
White NH 174 170 5 309 
Hispanic 157 109 0 486 
Asian NH 32 15 0 139 
Other NH 79 5 0 300 
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Figure 4.  Mean UoF Severity Score per 100,000 Residents, 
by Citizen Race/Ethnicity
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Table 10.  UoF Severity Score per 1,000 Arrests*, 
by Citizen Race 	
Sample:  11 Department-Years (only most recent year for each department) 
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black** 82 51 23 361 
White** 62 33 11 298 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include arrests for all offenses.   
**Use of Force data are for non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White 
citizens, whereas arrest data are for all Black and all White citizens regardless 
of ethnicity.  
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Figure 5.  Mean UoF Severity Score per 1,000 Arrests,
by Citizen Race 
Note: The difference in means between Black and White residents is statistically
significant at the <.05 level (p=.014).
  
  
 
                           
25 
 
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 
 
 
policingequity.org  
Table 11.  UoF Severity Score per 1,000 Arrests for 
Violent Offenses*, by Citizen Race 
Sample:  11 Department-Years (only most recent year for each department) 
		 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Black** 1368 917 433 4663 
White** 1738 821 475 8333 
 
*Arrest data were obtained from BJS and include arrests for Part I violent 
crimes only.   
**Use of Force data are for non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White 
citizens, whereas arrest data are for all Black and all White citizens 
regardless of ethnicity.  
 
 
 
These analyses are largely similar in scope to the analyses of Section III. They reveal a robust 
racial disparity benchmarked to population such that Blacks receive a mean use of force 
score—a combination of counts and severity—that is roughly 3.8 times higher than Whites. 
This disparity holds, but is reduced to roughly 1.3, when benchmarking use of force scores 
against all arrests. The direction of this disparity changes when controlling for arrests for 
violent Part I crimes, although the median severity score is higher for Blacks than for Whites. 
Importantly, 3 of 11 departments (27%) continue to demonstrate racial disparities in mean 
severity of use of force that disadvantage Blacks even in the context of this conservative test. 
  
  
  
 
                           
26 
 
THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND POLICE USE OF FORCE 
 
 
policingequity.org  
Conclusions 
Reviewing the four previous sections, three findings merit emphasis. First, even when 
controlling for arrest demographics, participating departments revealed racial disparities 
across multiple levels of force severity. Second, even when controlling for the very rare 
occurrence of arrest for Part I violent crime within a demographic—an event that previous 
research suggests is only modestly more likely in and of itself to result in a use of force 
incident—25%-55% of participating departments still revealed robust racial disparities that 
disadvantaged Blacks. Third, and finally, analyses of each department revealed that Tasers 
were the second most common use of force option, ranging from roughly 8 times to 18 times 
more common than use of deadly force and less common only than bodily contact—the least 
severe use of force option on the continuum. Taken together, these findings suggest: 
1) That racially disparate crime rate is an insufficient explanation of racially disparate use of 
force rates for this sample of police departments. Given that these departments range widely 
in size and represent urban cities, suburban counties, and transportation police in 
geographically diverse jurisdictions, the results are suggestive that these findings may 
generalize beyond the sample. 
2) That significant attention should be paid to additional situational factors in attempting to 
quantify and explain racial disparities in use of force. For instance, might racial disparities in 
the tendency to resist, flee, or disrespect officers be implicated in the observed differences? 
Might cultural mismatches and/or officers’ perceptions of cooperation be influenced by 
residents’ race? There is some suggestive evidence that there are racial disparities in 
resistance based on research by Smith and colleagues for the National Institute of Justice. 
They find that the rate of officer injury is lower when arresting a White suspect than a suspect 
of another racial group (Smith et al., 2009). However, this finding should be taken only as 
suggestive, since suspect resistance was not measured in a robust manner and a number of 
circumstances could have contributed to this finding. Each of these possibilities gains in 
importance if demographics of crime do not undergird racial disparities in the use of force. 
3) That increased attention ought to be paid to the use of Tasers in officers’ street-level 
encounters with residents. Previous research demonstrates that Taser usage has risen 
sharply, while other force options such as batons are down (Taylor et al., 2011). It may be that 
crime severity and/or resistance is often such that it requires a force option merely one step 
removed from lethal force. However, given that all officers in participating departments had 
access to several steps between physical contact and Tasers, and that the drop off between 
Tasers and discharging a firearm is so steep, it is at least plausible that Tasers have become 
a kind of default response to moderate threats. This may also be prudent. For example, 
research by Alpert and colleagues reveals that, in one sample, Taser usage reduced both 
officer and suspect injuries, with the odds of suspect injury decreasing by up to 60% (Alpert 
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et al., 2011). However, neither scholarly nor public discourse surrounding police force reflects 
the relative prevalence of Taser usage, suggesting the need to adjust both. 
In addition to these high-level takeaway messages, this report serves to demonstrate how 
the NJD can produce new insights into old problems. The goal of the NJD is to produce a 
high quality standardized database from which reports and scholarly articles like this can 
regularly advance our collective understanding of how police behaviors shape public life. By 
responding to both the gaps in the scientific literature and the needs of public policy, 
research from the NJD can position law enforcement leaders to ensure their officers engage 
communities in a manner consistent with their values. While this report reveals some 
troubling patterns, it also supplies courageous leaders with the opportunity to address a 
potentially wide-reaching problem proactively—the goal of any evidence-led approach to 
public safety. 
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